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Aggregative Growth Trends: Analysis
HAVING made our production indexes, we turn now to analyze what they
convey about the course of Soviet industrial growth.' In this chapter, we
shall provide only a broad sketch, to be filled in more fully in the next
one. Should it need repeating, we may say again that the qualifications
spelled out in earlier chapters should remain constantly in the back-
ground, to dull the edge of deceptively sharp figures.
It is also worth re-emphasizing that broad indexes of production are,
under the best of circumstances, only one kind of evidence useful for
assessing growth trends.Their usefulness is more limited in the Soviet
case than ordinarily because of the questionable reliability of Soviet data,
the swift and radical changes that have taken place in the Soviet economy
over the last thirty years, and the divergences among growth rates in
different sectors.This is to say that the discussion that follows supple-
ments rather than supplants what has come before.
Trends in Production
VARIATIONS IN GROWTH RATES OVER TIME
Average annual growth rates from moving-weight indexes are gathered
together for different periods in Table 35. Certain relations hold among
these growth rates no matter which production index is used.First, the
rate is significantly higher for 1928—1955 than for 1913—1955. This is a
trivial observation, since it has been made abundantly clear that there
was virtually no growth in over-all production between 1913 and 1928.
Second and much less obviously, the growth rate shows a decline between
1928—1940 and 1940—1955 and between 1928—1937 and 1950—1955, both
relations suggesting a tendency for growth to retard during the Plan
period.
In thinking about trends, one naturally wonders how the Soviet pace
of industrial growth compares with the Tsarist The statistical
record for the Tsarist period is, unfortunately, poor, and it is difficult to
make any confident judgments on the reliability of such data as have
1 Recall that industry is taken to include manufacturing, mining, logging, fishing,
and generating of electricity.
la For an 'enlightening discussion of industrial development in the Tsarist period, see
Alexander Gerschenkron, "The Rate of Industrial Growth in Russia since 1885," The
Tasks of Economic History, Supplement VII to Journal of Economic History, 1947, pp. 144—174.
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TABLE 35
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION:











































SOURCE: Moving-weight indexes, Table 30.Current territory except 1913, which
covers interwar territory. Average annual growth rates calculated from data for terminal
years by the compound interest formula.
been recorded. Production indexes have been constructed, perhaps the
best known being the one made by Kondratiev in the l920's.2If that
index is revised to conform with the present Western methods of construct-
ing production indexes and extended backward from 1885 through 1860,
it shows an average annual growth rate of about 5.3 per cent applying to
the last half century—and even the last quarter century—of the Tsarist
period (see Table 36). A recomputation of the index directly frolTn
primary sources by Raymond Goldsmith and Israel Borenstein leads to
virtually the same result, while a production index for industrial materials
with 1913 weights shows a higher growth rate over 1860—1913 but about
the same rate over 1885—1913.
It must be stressed that these indexes for the Tsarist period rest on a
weak and unverifiable foundation, in terms of both the sample of industries
covered and the reliability of the data.3 All this is to argue that these
indexes cannot be considered as reliable as, say, those for the late nine-
teenth century in the United States, if only because there was nothing in
Tsarist Russia to correspond with the periodic U.S. censuses. With this
2Ekonomicheskiibiulleten' [Economic Bulletin], 1926, No. 2, Pp. 17—21; discussed in
detail by Ia. P. Gerchuk in Voprosy koniunktury [Problems of the Economic Situation],
Moscow, 1926, Vol. II, Issue 1, pp. 79—95. This and the other indexes in Table 36 are
discussed briefly in technical note 5 of Appendix A.
'Ourindex covers the following numbers of industries:1860—1880, fourteen; 1880—
1885, fifteen;1885—1888, sixteen;1888—1895, twenty-one;1895—1900, twenty-two;
1900—1910, twenty-five; and 1910—1913, twenty-three.
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TABLE 36










1860 9.0 8.8 5.7
1865 7.1 7.5 4.3
1870 11 11 6.4
1875 15 14 9.9
1880 19 18 13
1885 23 24 19
1888 25 26 23
1890 29 32 25
1895 40 44 39
1900 59 63 59
1905 61 61 60
1910 84 86 78








1870—1890 5.0 5.5 7.1
1880—1900 5.8 6.5 7.9
1890—1910 5,5 5.1 5.9
1900—1913 4.1 3.6 4.1
1870—1913 5.3 5.3 5.4
SouRcE: Table A-19. Covers current Tsarist territory excluding Finland. For 1913,
output of industrial materials (col. 3) in Tsarist territory is 118 per cent of output in
interwar Soviet territory. Average annual growth rates calculated from data for terminal
years by the compound interest formula.
reservation in mind, we note the average annual growth rate over
1870—1913 was higher than over 1913—1955 and lower than over 1928—
1955, though the rate over 1880—1900 is very close to the latter, particul-
arly if territorial gains are eliminated (see Table 38).
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE OF GROWTH RATES
Rates of growth have differed substantially among the various sectors of
Soviet industry as well as over time (see Table 37 and Chart 15). Dividing
the civilian component of industry into ten industrial groups, we find
average annual growth rates ranging from 2.3 per cent (food and allied
products) to 12.9 per cent (consumer durables) over the entire Soviet
period, or from 3.3 per cent (textiles and allied products) to 18.7 per cent
(consumer durables) over the Plan period. If these ten groups are further












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Indexes of Industrial Production, by Jndustrial Group:
Index (19i3= 100)























Textiles and allied products
Food and allied products
30
1913 '28'32'37 '40 '45'50'55
Source: Table 17, moving weights.
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annual growth rates for the entire Soviet period and the Plan period,
respectively:intermediate industrial products, 5.5 and 8.4 per cent;
civilian machinery and equipment, 8.4 and 11.9 per cent; and consumer
goods, 2.6 and 4.2 per cent. These data merely confirm what was ob-
served at an earlier point through the study of frequency distributions of
growth rates for individual industries.
Although aggregate output increased very little between 1913 and
1928, the growth record varied considerably from one segment of in-
dustry to another. At one extreme, the average annual growth rate for
agricultural machinery over this period was somewhat higher than it
was over the Plan period. Output grew on the average in the cases of
agricultural machinery, consumer durables, fuel and electricity, chemicals,
and textiles and allied products. It declined in the cases of food and allied
products, ferrous metals, construction materials, transportation equip-
ment, and nonferrous metals.
The growth rate declined between 1928—1940 and 1940—1955 in the
case of every industrial group except agricultural machinery, which
showed an exceptional performance here as well.Similar declines are
observed between 1928—1937 and 1950—1955 except for food and textiles,
in which cases the growth rate rose.This pattern indicates that the
retardation in growth recorded for all industry has been widely diffused
through industrial segments.
INDUSTRIAL GROWTH AND TERRITORIAL EXPANSION
During and after World War II, the Soviet Union acquired the Baltic
countries, about half of Poland, a part of Rumania, and some other
scattered regions.Territory was expanded by about 700 thousand
square kilometers (an area larger than France), and population by more
than 20 million people as of 1939. The enlarged territory slightly exceeds
in area the prerevolutionary territory; on the other hand, the population
in 1913 was smaller within the post-1939 territory than within the
prerevolutionary territory—l 59 million as opposed to 166 million.
It is impossible to make an accurate and precise measurement of the
industrial gains realized from territorial expansion as of any specific date
after 1939. The economic gains were resources that could be employed
in a variety of uses, and the specific forms of those resources when
acquired merely set temporary limits on their uses. By the nature of the
problem, however, about the only way we can measure industrial gains
is in terms of acquisitions of existing industrial resources. Ultimate gains
will be understated to the extent that acquired areas have since been
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industrialized more rapidly Out of their "own" resources than the rest
of the Soviet Union, or overstated to the extent that they have been
industrialized less rapidly. We do not have the data needed to shed light
on matters of this sort, and it is doubtful that we could say anything very
satisfactory under the best of circumstances.
If we keep these qualifications in mind, we may estimate very roughly
the industrial gains from territorial expansion. In the first place, we may
calculate the relative importance of industrial production in the acquired
territories at the time of acquisition. The latest satisfactory date, from
the point of view of both normalcy of conditions and availability of data,
is 1937.In that year, the production of industrial materials (fifty pro-
ducts) was 6 per cent larger in the expanded territory than in the interwar
territory when measured in 1928 prices,4 and 10 per cent larger when
measured in 1955 prices. These figures understate gains for two reasons:
first, because they do not fully reflect small-scale production in the
acquired territories; and second, because by 1937 those territories had not
fully recovered from the Great Depression.
Anotherapproach isto calculate the relative share of industrial
productionaccounted for bythe territorieslost after the Communist
revolution, since, as mentioned above, these areas are in some respects
roughly equivalent to those gained during and after World War II. The
production of industrial materials (thirty-seven products) in those lost
territories was in 1913 about 18 per cent of production within interwar
boundaries, when measured in 1913 prices. This figure may also be an
understatement in that small-scale production in the lost territories is not
fully included.
It is perhaps reasonable to take the geometric average of these three
estimates,or 11 per cent,as a rough measure of the increase in industrial
production attributable to territorial expansion. On an average annual
basis the percentage increase would be as follows:0.3 per cent for
1913—1955; 0.4 percent for 1928—1955;and 0.9 per cent for 1928—1940.
Growth rates in production adjusted for territorial changes are given in
Table 38.
INDUSTRIAL GROWTH AND POPULATION
The discussion of industrial growth in this chapter has been, up to this
point, entirely in terms of raw growth rates, unadjusted for growth in
population.For some purposes, itis useful to express growth in per
This estimate is identical with Naum Jasriy's estimate for 1940.See his The Soviet
Economy during the Plan Era, Stanford, 1951, p. 22. Our estimates are explained in Table
D-1, notes c and d.
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TABLE 38
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION ADJUSTED FOR TERRITORIAL EXPANSION
AND POPULATION GROWTH: SOVIET UNION, SELECTED PERIODS, 1913—1955
(per cent)












































































SOURCE: Tables 35 and C-3. For effects of territorial expansion, see text surrounding this table.
aAverageannual growth in production attributable to territorial expansion is taken as: 0.3 per cent
for 1913—1955; 0.4 per cent for 1928—1955; and 0.9 per cent for 1928—1940. Average annual growth
rates calculated from data for terminal years by the compound interest formula.
bDerivedfrom unadjusted production and population. Average annual growth in population is
takenas 0.9 per cent for 1913—1955; 0.6 per cent for 1913—1928; 1.0 per cent for 1928—1955; 2.3 per
cent for 1928—1940; —0.0 per centfor 1940—1955; 1.0 per cent for 1928—1937;and 1.7 per cent for
1950—1955.
capitaterms, particularly when one is interested in relating growth in
output to growth in productive capacity.
Population is sometimes, however, a very poor indicator of productive
capacity.At least during the interwar years of the Soviet period, a
sizable fraction of the population was, for all practical purposes, economi-
cally unproductive: reducing the labor force in some sectors of the econ-
omy—especially agriculture—probably caused no perceptible reduction
in output.This meant, for example, that the great loss of population
through starvation in the 1920's and 1930's probably had the paradoxical
result of increasing the concurrent per capita output: there were fewer
mouths to feed and fewer bodies to clothe, so to speak, without a commen-
surate reduction in utilized productive capacity. We must also note that
Soviet population statistics are of doubtful reliability for much of the
Soviet period.5 Under such conditions, there are obvious difficulties in
interpreting the meaning of per capita growth rates.
Full demographic details were last published in connection with the population
census of 1926, though it appears more information than usual will be made public on
the census of 1959. The census of 1937 was declared faulty by Stalin, and most of the
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Despite these difficulties, the picture of industrial growth would be
incomplete without relating it to population, as is done in Table 38. As
would be anticipated, the rates of population growth have varied
from period to period during the Soviet era, reflecting, of course, the
effects of territorial changes as well as internal demographic conditions.
For the periods shown in Table 38, the per capita growth rates are less
dispersed than the total growth rates, whether or not the latter are
adjusted for territorial coverage. However, retardation is reflected in the
per capita growth rates as well as in the total ones.
Trends in Labor Productivity
Growth in productive capacity springs from growth in resources or im-
proved efficiency in their use.In studying the importance of each, the
usual procedure is to measure the volume of resources employed, by
means of an index combining capital and labor services, and to compare
that with the volume of output.Unfortunately, statistics on capital
inputs into Soviet industry are in such a poor state that we cannot make
this kind of comparison.6 We must instead be content to compare output
and employment of labor.
GROWTH IN INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT
Comprehensive statistics on Soviet industrial employment, wage rates,
or hours of work have yet to be published, so that here again we are forced
to do the best we can with such partial information as has been made
available. Our estimates are presented and discussed in technical note 7
of Appendix A, and we shall describe them only briefly here.
The basic estimates are for persons engaged in industry, expressed in
full-time equivalents as measured by the average work-year (in days or
leading demographers participating in it were purged; the results were never published,
except for a few fragments. A second census was conducted in 1939, and a few aggregative
statistics were published. No further figures were published until 1956, when an official
estimate for April 1956 was announced. The problems Western scholars have en-
countered in constructing estimates of population are demonstrated by the fact that
Western estimates of population in 1956 had typically run about 10 per cent higher than
the figure finally published (see Statistical Handbook of the USSR, Harry Schwartz, editor,
New York, 1957, p. 16). Our population series (Table C-3) is taken from a working
memorandum written by Harold Wool for this study.
6Sovietauthorities have recently expressed dissatisfaction with the official figures on
industrial wealth and have indicated that a full count of inventory will be needed to put
the facts in order (see, e.g., V. Starovskii, "Novye zadachi sovetskoi statistiki" [New
Tasks of Soviet Statistics], Kommunist [The Communist], 1957, No. 14, p. 68). Some
results of that count are provided in Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1959 godu [The USSR
National Economy in 1959], Moscow, 1960, pp. 65 if.
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TABLE 39
INDEXES OF INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT, BY INDUSTRIAL GROUP:




All products 100 74 105 151 203 253 284
PERSONS ENGAGEDa
All products 100 92 149 210 225 275 333
Ferrous and nonferrous metals 100 66 135 147 142 235 264
Fuel and electricity 100 128 245 258 296 444 540
Fuel 100 127 230 235 272 400 481
Electricity 100 140 485 625 6701,1451,475
Chemicals 100 143 399 501 593 631 899
Construction matcrialsb 100 76 178 175 204 276 345
Wood materialsb 100 72 168 180 206 261 269
Mineral materials 100 96 225 152 197 347 502
Machinery and allied productsc 100 109 408 515 559 721 886
Civilian machinery and equipment 100 129 268 604 412 622 857
Food and allied products 100 75 102 138 145 153 167
Textiles and allied productsd 100 104 108 139 148 141 181




CCoverscivilian machinery, equipment, and metal products; military products; and consumer
durables.
dFor1937 and later years, covers furniture.
weeks) in large-scale industry. For all industry, persons engaged have
been taken as the sum of workers and employees, members of industrial
producer cooperatives, self-employed personnel, and workers in industrial
enterprises attached to collective farms.In the virtual absence of data
on wages by industrial categories, we are forced to use an unweighted
aggregate. Recent evidence suggests that our totals progressively under-
state the true total after 1933, so that growth in employment since that
year is probably significantly understated, perhaps by as much as 15 per
cent.7
For benchmark years through 1933, persons engaged can be directly
estimated for industrial groups as well as for all industry;for later
years, the industrial breakdown must be derived indirectly by distributing
the aggregate on the basis of published percentage distributions of
production workers (promyshlennye rabochie). On the basis of evidence for
1933 and 1935, the latter procedure is likely to cause an understatement
of persons engaged in producing electricity, machinery and equipment,
See technical note 7 in Appendix A.
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and possibly mineral construction materials;itis likely to cause an
overstatement in the cases of other industrial categories. Hence, on this
count, growth in employment since 1933 may be understated in the
former categories and overstated in the latter. The estimates as they
stand are given in Table 39.
It is, finally, possible to estimate the annual man-hours of employment
in all industry on the basis of rather fragmentary data on average annual
days and average daily hours worked by production workers in large-
scale industry. Again, the information available is far from ideal, and it
is impossible to say how much error there may be in applying it to all
persons engaged, or in what direction the error lies. The average annual
hours worked, estimated in this way, have fluctuated widely over the
Soviet period, falling from 1913 through 1933, rising thereafter almost to
the prerevolutionary level by 1950, and falling again through 1955,
when they were still higher than in 1928 (see Table A-23 of Appendix A).
Hence the total annual man-hours increased less, percentagewise, than
total persons engaged over 1913—1955, but more over 1928—1955 (see
Table 39).
TABLE40
INDEXESOF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT PER UNIT OF LABOR, BY INDUSTRIAL GROUP:
SOVIET UNION, BENCHMARK YEARS, 1913—1955
(1913=100)
1913 1928 1933 1937 1940 1950 1955
OUTPUT PER MAN-HOUR
All products 100 137 146 188 157 155 218
OUTPUTPER PERSON
Allproducts 100 111 103 135 141 143 186
Ferrousand nonferrous metals 100 133 116 254 282 245 374
Fuelandelectricity 100 118 150 259 287 284 369
Fuel 100 101 116 178 191 187 238
Electricity 100 184 173 298 371 410 593
Chemicals 100 101 76 130 109 186 181
Construction materialsb 100 119 81 116 97 101 123
Wood materialsb 100 121 88 101 90 98 134
Mineral materials 100 109 57 194 127 110 144
Machineryand allied productsc 100 111 100 274 314 275 367
Civilian machinery and equipment 100 111 249 286 291 449 405
Food and allied products 100 112 91 111 108 110 156
Textilesand allied productsd 100 109 94 109 118 127 152
SOURCE: Table A-24. Note that some industrial groups have a different coverage from that in
Table 37.
Persons engaged in full-time equivalents.
bCovers paper and matches.
CCoverscivilian machinery, equipment, and metal products;military products; and consumer
durables.
d For 1937andlater years, furniture is covered for persons engaged butnotfor output. This latter












GROWTH IN OUTPUT PER UNIT OF LABOR
Our estimates of movements in Soviet industrial outputper unit of labor
employed are presented in Tables 40 and 41 and in Charts 16 and 17.
According to these estimates, output per man-hour multiplied about
2.2 times between 1913 and 1955 and about 1.6 times between 1928 and
1955, growing at average annual rates of 1.9 and 1.7per cent; output
per person engaged multiplied about 1.9and 1.7 times, growingat
average annual rates of 1.5 and 1.9 per cent. Within shorter spans of
years, the two types of measures have differed more markedly from each
other, output per man-hour showing a faster growth than outputper
person engaged in some periods and a slower growth in others.This
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CHART 17
Indexes of Industrial Output per Person Engaged. by Industrial Group:


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































follows, of course, from the fluctuations in hours of work for the average
worker already commented on.
How much has growth in labor productivity contributed toward growth
in output? This question may be answered obliquely by pointing out that,
had there been no improvement in output per man-hour (or person
engaged), output of all industrial products would have multiplied 46
per cent (or 54 per cent) as much as it did over 1913—1955 and 63 per
cent (or 60 per cent) as much over 1928—1955. Hence improved labor
productivity may be thought of as accounting for 46 to 54 per cent of
the multiplication in output over 1913—1955 and 37 to 40 per cent
over 1928—1955, the percentage depending on whether productivity is
measured in terms of persons engaged or man-hours.
It is interesting that output per man-hour apparently grew faster over
1913—1928 than over 1928—1955. Despite the fact that industrial output
showed no net increase over the pre-Plan years, productive capacity
apparently grew at an impressive rate. The growth in output per man-
hour over the pre-Plan years was associated with a sharp decline in
annual hours of work for the average person engaged in industry, which
may have had something to do with the marked improvement in hourly
labor productivity. In any event, output per person engaged grew at a
much slower average pace than output per man-hour: 0.7 per cent a
year compared with 2.2 per cent.
Within the Plan years, labor productivity seems to have accelerated.
This seems particularly clear in the case of output per man-hour: the
average annual growth rate rose between 1928—1940 and 1940—1955,
and between 1928—1937 and 1950—1955. Growth in output per person
engaged also accelerated between the latter pair of periods, although it
retarded very slightly between the former pair. The difference in behavior
of the two measures can be explained by the increase in hours of work
in the years surrounding World War II.
The picture for industrial groups is much more mixed. Growth in
output per person engaged seems to have retarded over the Plan period in
the cases of fuel, mineral construction materials, and machinery and
allied products;it seems to have accelerated in the cases of wood con-
struction materials, food and allied products, and textiles and allied
products. The trend of growth rates is doubtful in the cases of ferrous
and nonferrous metals, electricity, and chemicals.
COMPARISON OF OUR ESTIMATES WITH OTHERS
Few studies of Soviet industrial labor productivity have been made by
Western scholars, the two best known probably being those of Hodgman
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TABLE42
COMPARISONOF NBER AND HODGMAN INDEXES OF SOVIET INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT
PER UNIT OF LABOR, BENCHMARK YEARS, 1928—1g50
OUTPUT PER MAN-YEAR OUTPUT PER MAN-HOUR
NBERa Hodgman NBER& Hodgman
ActualbAdjustede ActualbAdjustedc
INDEX (1928100)
1928 100 100 100 100 100 100
1933 93 103 63 107 113 69
1937 122 155 91 137 167 98
1940 127 169 115 167
1950 129 201 115 113





103 63 107 113 69
1933—1937 150 144 128 148 142
1937—1940 104 109 84 100
1940—1950 102 119 98 110
1937—1950 106 130 126 82 110 107
SOURCE: Table 40; Hodgman, Soviet Industrial Production, pp. 113 and 117; and as indicated below.
aBasedon persons engaged. Covers all industry (including military products) except repair shops.
b Based on production workers.Output covers large-scale industry in 1928, with the coverage
expanding to all industry by around 1933; workers cover almost all industry in all years (see footnote
13 of this chapter).
Hodgman's adjusted production index (see Table 34) divided by our adjusted version of his employ-
ment index (see Table 43, columns 2 and 5). Both output and employment cover large-scale industry,
with the coverage expanding to all industry by around 1933 (see text).
and Galenson.,8 In addition, there is the very recent estimate by Kaplan
and Moorsteen, which is based on a more comprehensive study of Soviet
industrial growth.9 All differ from ours in coverage of output and employ-
ment and other important respects, commented on below. The Hodgman
and Kaplan-Moorsteen estimates of labor productivity, like ours, are
derived from aggregative indexes of output and employment, while
Galenson's are based on physical output and employment for a small
number of narrowly defined industries, covering only a small segment of
industry.10
There is very little correspondence between the movements of our
indexes of labor productivity and Hodgman's (see Table 42).This is
Donald Hodgman, Soviet Industrial Production, 1928—1951, Cambridge, Mass., 1954,
pp. 109—122; Walter Galenson, Labor Productivity in Soviet and American Industry, New
York, 1955.
N. M. Kaplan and R. M. Moorsteen, "Indexes of Soviet Industrial Production"
(mimeographed), RAND Corporation, RM-2495, Santa Monica, 1960, pp. 152 if.
10Forinterwar years beginning with 1928, Galenson's indexes cover the seven in-
dustries shown in Table 42; for years beginning with 1932 and generally ending with
1936, they alsO cover four industries producing durable producer goods (see Galenson,
Labor Productivity, p. 234).
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TABLE 43
COMPARISON OF NBER AND HODOMAN INDEXES OF LABOR INPUTS INTO SOVIET INDUSTRY,
BENCHMARK YEARS, 1928—1950
MAN-YEARS MAN-HOURS
Hod,gman, Production NBER, Hodgman, Production NBER,
Workersa Persons Workersa Persons
Actual Adjustedb Engagedc Actual Adjusted" Engagedc
INDEX (1928 =100)
1928 100 100 100 100 100 100
1933 187 304 161 170d 277d 141
1937 240 407 228 223 379 203
1940 254 244 257 272





1928—1933 187 304 161 170 277 141
1933—1937 128 134 142 131 137 144
1937—1940 106 107 115 134
1940—1950 127 122 138 125
1937—1950 134 138 130 159 163 167
SouRcE: Tables A-23 and C-i; Hodgman, Soviet Industrial Production, pp. 112 and 116.
aIncludesrepair shops.
b Based on series of production workers as given in footnote 13 of this chapter, covering large-
scale industry in 1928 and all industry thereafter.
CExcludesrepair shops.
d Man-years in 1933 times average annual man-hours in 1932 as given by Hodgman, Soviet
Industrial Production, p. 116.
due in part to significant differences between the underlying production
indexes, commented on at some length elsewhere."It is also due to
differences in employment indexes, though these are much less marked
despite the fact that Hodgman's index covers only production workers
while ours covers all persons engaged (see Table 43).The greatest
discrepancy in the movements of the employment indexes occurs over
the periods 1928—1933 and 1933—1937 and is explained by the fact that
there was a great bulge in employment in repair shops—included in
Hodgman's index but excluded from ours-—-around 1933.In accord
with standard custom, it seems doubtful that repair shops should be
included in industry.
Two general shortcomings of Hodgman's data deserve further comment.
First, military products are covered directly by employment data but
only indirectly—and, as Hodgman observes,'2 inadequately—by produc-
tion data. This seems to make most difference over the period 1940—1950.
Seethe last section of the preceding chapter and technical note 4 of Appendix A.
12Hodgman,Soviet Industrial Production, p. 88.See also our discussion surrounding
Table 31.
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According to our indexes, production of civilian products increased by
44 per cent, production of all products by 23 per cent, persons engaged
by 22 per cent, and man-hours by 25 per cent.If the production index
for civilian products were used to compute changes in labor productivity,
we would find that output per person engaged increased by 18 per cent
and output per man-hour by 15 per cent, which are close to the increases
of 19 and 10 per cent shown by Hodgman's calculations.If,however,
the production index for all products is used, we find that output per
person engaged increased by only 2 per cent while output per man-hour
decreased by 2 per cent.
Second, the coverage of Hodgman's production index is restricted to
large-scale industry in 1928 and gradually expands to encompass all
industry around 1933.His employment index, on the other hand,
apparently covers all industry in all years, beginning with If his
employment data are adjusted to the same coverage as his output data—
as we have done in columns 2 and 5 of Table 43—the movements of his
labor productivity indexes are markedly changed, primarily over the
13Hodgmanuses "industry section" data on production workers in large-scale in-
dustry, and these encompass many industries assigned in output statistics for the late
1920's to small-scale industry (see Socialist Construction in the USSR, Moscow, 1936, p. 394).
While "labor section" data are, for other reasons (see ibid.), not strictly comparable in
coverage to output data, the definition of large-scale industry was at least consistently
applied over those early years. The two sets of data are as follows (average annual
number of wage earners in thousands from D. Redding, "USSR Industrial Employment
and Its Distribution" (mimeographed), Council for Economic and Industry Research
Report No. A-8, Washington, 1955, p. 8):
1928 1933
Large-scale industry
"Industry section" data 3,699 6,901
"Labor section" data 2,558 4,784
All industry
"Industry section" data n.a. 7,900
"Labor section" data 3,865 7,866
To be comparable with his production index, Hodgman's employment data should
cover large-scale industry for 1928 and total industry for 1933 onward. In terms of
production workers ("industry section" wage earners), the series would run as follows





The figure for 1928 has been extrapolated by the "labor section" data given above:
the figures for 1937 and 1950 are taken from Barney Schwalberg, Industrial Employment
in the USSR, 1933, 1937, 1950, and 1955, Bureau of the Census, Series P-95, No. 55,
Washington, 1960, p. 51.
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period 1928—1933 (see columns 3 and 6 of Table 42). We also note, by
comparing these revised indexes with our counterparts, that over this
period output per unit of labor showed a much sharper decline within
the segment of industry covered by Hodgman than within industry as a
whole, from which we can conclude that labor productivity fell in large-
scale industry but rose in (at least what was formerly) small-scale industry.
The former overbalanced the latter in man-year productivity, but the
reverse was true in man-hour productivity, which is probably more
significant. More detailed evidence confirming these conclusions will be
presented in the next chapter.
Galenson's findings on labor productivity diverge even further from
ours than Hlodgman's do, as may be seen from Table 44. The primary
explanation seems to lie in the small and unrepresentative sample of
industries covered by Galenson. Only seven industries were studied for
the period 1928—1937, their production workers accounting in the
aggregate for 19 per cent of total industrial employment in 1928, 15 per
cent in 1933, and 13 per cent in 1937. The coverage is much higher for
metals (ranging from 56 to 72 per cent) and fuel (ranging from 52 to 61
per cent); somewhat higher for food and allied products (ranging from
22 to 27 per cent); and much lower for textiles and allied products
(ranging from 6 to 9 per cent). Other industrial groups are not covered
at all—electricity, chemicals, and construction materials. In general, the
covered industries show a more rapid growth in labor productivity than
the industrial groups they represent (if we may use our indexes for the
latter), and the better represented groups show a more rapid growth
than the more poorly represented ones (see Tables 44 and 40).Both
factors work to make Galenson's combined index much higher than our
aggregate index.
To the extent that they may be directly compared, the Kaplan-
Moorsteen indexes of labor productivity behave much more like ours than
those of Hodgman and Galenson. As we stated toward the end of the
preceding chapter, the Kaplan-Moorsteen indexes appeared too late to
make it possible for us to analyze them thoroughly and compare them
meaningfully with ours. One comparison that seems justified without
extensive adjustments is presented in Table 45, applying to intermediate
industrial products—referred to by Kaplan and Moorsteen as "producers'
goods other than machinery." Their and our indexes of output per man-
year for this sector move in a rather parallel fashion, such differences as
there are probably being explainable in terms of the foliDwing factors:
different weight bases for the production indexes—i 950 for theirs and a
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TABLE 44
COMPARISON OF NBER AND GALENSON INDEXES OF SOVIET INDUSTRIAL
















NBER, ferrous and nonferrous metals
Galenson, iron ore mining










































SOURCE: Table 40; and Galenson, Labor Productivity, pp. 234 and 236.
a For NBER, derived from output and persons engaged in all industry; for Galenson,
from physical output and production workers in the large-scale segment except for the
shoe industry, which is fully covered.
Employment covered by Galenson accounts for the following fractions of all persons
engaged excluding those in repair shops (Galenson, Labor Productivity, pp. 16, 91, 99,
123, 186 f, 214, 216, and 224; and this monograph, Table A-20):
1928 1933 1937
(per cent)
All industries 19.4 15.3 12.9
Ferrous and nonferrous metals 71.9 56.4 57.5
Fuel 61.4 52.2 60.5
Food and allied products 9.4 6.1 6.4
Textiles and allied products 27.3 22.4 26.3
The coverage given here for all industries is smaller for all years than that given by
Galenson (p. 242), but we have not been able to reconcile his coverage ratios with the
underlying data he cites.
b 1938.
moving base for ours; different weighting systems for product groups in
the production indexes—estimated wage-bills for theirs and estimated
employment for ours;different product coverage in the production
indexes—nonferrous metals are excluded from theirs and included in ours,
along with other differences in the treatment of individual products;
and different concepts of employment—production workers for theirs and
persons engaged for ours.
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TABLE45
COMPARISON NBER AND KAPLAN-MOORSTEEN INDEXES OF SOVIET OUTPUT PER MAN-YEAR OF










MoorsteenaNBERb Workers Engaged MoorsteenNBER
1928 100 100 100 100 100 100
1932 192 184 179 108
1933 198 222 89
1937 311 351 188 229 164 153
1940 334 386 218 260 151 148
1950 467 567 315 363 146 156
1955 748 872 392 423 186 206
SOURCE: Tables 53 and A-20; Kaplan and Moorsteen, "Indexes of Soviet Industrial Output,"
pp. 235, 268, and 269.
a Based on 1950 Soviet weights.
b Based on moving Soviet weights.
There remains, finally, to be considered the official Soviet index of
labor productivity (see Table 46). The exact nature of this index is a
mystery, apparently even to Soviet economists, though it seems most
likely—as the well-known Soviet economist Strumilin has assumed—that
it refers to gross output per production worker in large-scale industry:'4
As would be expected from the exaggerated measure of industrial produc-
tion in the official Soviet index, this index of labor productivity shows a
much more rapid growth over the Plan period than ours does.
Concluding Remarks
We have seen that Soviet industrial output multiplied about six times
(5.5 times, if territorial gains are eliminated) between 1913 or 1928 and
1955, which is less than the growth over the last forty years of the Tsarist
period and more than the growth over the last twenty-five years. Output
multiplied about nine times in the case of intermediate industrial
products, twenty to thirty times in the case of civilian machinery and
equipment, and three times in the case of consumer goods. On a per
capita basis, these factors would be about 70 per cent as large for 191 3—
1955 and 76 per cent as large for 1928—1955.
Over 1913—1955, employment of labor multiplied 2.8 times in terms of
man-hours and 3.3 times in. terms of over 1928—1955, the
Forsome rather convincing comments on the nature of this index, see Schwalberg,
Industrial Employment, pp. 11 if.
182ANALYSIS
TABLE46
COMPARISONOF NBER AND OFFICIAL SOVIET INDEXES OF INDUSTRIAL
OUTPUT PER MAN-YEAR OF LABOR, BENCHMARK YEARS, 1928—1955
(1928 =100)
Output perMan- Yeara Employment
Implied
Official Official
NBER Soviet NBERb Sovietc
1928 100 100 100 100
1932 141 231
1933 93 161
1937 122 258 228 293
1940 127 343 243 317
1950 129 470 297 406
1955 168 679 360 534
SOURCE: Tables 39 and 40; and Promyshlennost', 1957, pp. 25 and 31.
a The NBER index refers to output per person engaged; the official Soviet index,
apparently to output per production worker in large-scale state and cooperative industry,
withvaryingcoverage (see Schwalberg,Industrial pp. 11if).
bPersons engaged, from Table39.
Apparentlyproduction workers in large-scale industry (see note a above). Derived
fromofficial Sovietindex of large-scale industrial production divided by official Soviet
indexof output per unit of labor (second column of this table).
comparablefactors are 3.8 and 3.6. Employment has therefore accounted
for 44 to 56 per cent of the multiplication in output over 1913—1955 and
for 60 to 63 per cent over 1928—1955, with improved labor productivity
accounting for the remainder. Put another way, output per man-hour
(or person engaged) multiplied about 2.2 (or 1.9) times over 1913—1955
and 1.6 (or 1.7) times over 1928—1955.
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